Persuasion of a privately informed receiver by Kolotilin, Anton et al.
PERSUASION OF A PRIVATELY INFORMED RECEIVER
Anton Kolotilin, Tymofiy Mylovanov, Andriy Zapechelnyuk
and Ming Li
Abstract. We study persuasion mechanisms in linear environments. A receiver
has a private type and chooses between two actions. A sender designs a persua-
sion mechanism or an experiment to disclose information about a payoff-relevant
state. A persuasion mechanism conditions information disclosure on the receiver’s
report about his type, whereas an experiment discloses information independent of
the receiver’s type. We establish the equivalence of implementation by persuasion
mechanisms and by experiments, and characterize optimal persuasion mechanisms.
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1. Introduction
In numerous situations, an uninformed sender (she) wishes to influence an action
of a receiver (he) who privately knows his preference type but is uncertain about a
payoff-relevant state. The sender has full control over information disclosure about
the state but cannot use any other incentive tools such as monetary transfers. If the
sender knew the receiver’s type, she would tailor information disclosure to the type.
However, the sender can only ask the receiver to report his type, which the receiver
may misreport in order to affect the information he receives. This begs the question
of whether the sender can benefit by designing a complex persuasion mechanism that
tailors information disclosure to the receiver’s report, as compared to an experiment
that provides the same information about the state, regardless of the receiver’s report.
In our model, the receiver must choose one of two actions. The sender’s and
receiver’s utilities depend linearly on the state and receiver’s type.1 The sender and
receiver share a common prior about the state; the receiver privately knows his type.
The sender commits to a persuasion mechanism that asks the receiver to report his
type and returns a stochastic message that depends on the state and report. After
receiving the message, the receiver updates his beliefs about the state and takes an
action that maximizes his expected utility.
We characterize the set of the receiver’s interim utilities implementable by persua-
sion mechanisms.2 The upper and lower bounds are achieved by full disclosure and no
disclosure of information about the state. For any mapping from messages to actions
under a persuasion mechanism, the receiver’s expected utility is linear in his type.
Because each type chooses an optimal mapping, the receiver’s interim utility is an up-
per envelope of linear functions and, hence, is convex. To sum up, an implementable
interim utility is necessarily a convex function that lies between the upper and lower
bounds generated by full and no disclosure.
Our main theorem shows that (1) this necessary condition is also sufficient and that
(2) any implementable interim utility can be attained by an experiment. Moreover,
in our model the receiver’s interim utility uniquely determines the sender’s expected
utility. Therefore, there is no loss of generality in restricting attention to experiments.
In particular, the sender need not consider more complex persuasion mechanisms that
condition information disclosure on the receiver’s report.
We now outline the argument behind this result. Because the utilities are linear in
the state, the only relevant content of a message about the state is the posterior mean.
Therefore, an experiment can be fully described by the distribution of the posterior
mean state H that it generates. By Blackwell (1953), there exists an experiment that
generates H if and only if the prior distribution of the state is a mean-preserving
spread of H. By linearity, the receiver’s interim utility U can be represented as an
1For our analysis to apply, we only need to assume that the utilities are linear in some transfor-
mation of the state and are arbitrary functions of the receiver’s type. The state and receiver’s type
are one-dimensional independent random variables.
2The receiver’s interim utility is the mapping from the receiver’s type to his expected utility given
optimal behavior under a persuasion mechanism.
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appropriate integral of H. Using the integral form of the mean-preserving spread
condition as in Blackwell (1951), we show that the prior is a mean-preserving spread
of H if and only if U is convex and lies between the upper and lower bounds generated
by full and no disclosure. Therefore, any U that satisfies the necessary conditions that
we identified above is implementable by an experiment.
This characterization allows us to formulate the sender’s problem as the maxi-
mization of a linear functional on a bounded set of convex functions. We derive a
general structure of optimal persuasion mechanisms and use it to simplify the sender’s
problem into a finite-variable optimization problem.
Related Literature. Our model is a variation of Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011),
who show that an optimal experiment corresponds to a point on the concave closure
of the sender’s value function. This concavification approach does not rely on any
structure of the problem such as the linearity of utility functions or the two actions of
the receiver. However, as Gentzkow and Kamenica (2016) point out, this approach has
limited applicability when the state space is infinite because it requires to calculate a
concave closure on the infinite-dimensional space of distributions over the state space.
Rayo and Segal (2010) impose more structure on the receiver’s utility and the dis-
tribution of the receiver’s type than our paper. At the same time, they allow the
sender’s utility to be nonlinear in the state. Rayo and Segal (2010) partially charac-
terize optimal experiments and represent the sender’s problem as the maximization
problem of a concave objective function subject to linear constraints. In our setting,
their assumptions about the receiver would imply that either full or no disclosure is
optimal.
Kolotilin (2016) allows for nonlinear sender’s and receiver’s utility functions and
an arbitrary joint distribution of the state and the receiver’s type. The linear-
programming approach in Kolotilin (2016) permits to verify whether a candidate
experiment is optimal. But this approach has limited applicability because it does
not allow to directly characterize the optimal experiments.
The three papers above study experiments.3 In contrast, we consider persuasion
mechanisms, which can tailor information disclosure to the receiver’s report.4 Linear
utility functions with two possible actions of the receiver enable us to use the enve-
lope representation of incentive compatibility as in Myerson (1981). However, the
characterization of implementable mechanisms in our setting differs from Myerson
(1981) because there are no transfers between the sender and receiver, and there are
3There is a rapidly growing Bayesian persuasion literature that studies optimal experiments.
Bayesian persuasion with a privately informed sender is considered in Gill and Sgroi (2008, 2012),
Perez-Richet (2014), Alonso and Caˆmara (2016b), and Hedlund (2017). Bayesian persuasion with
multiple senders is analyzed in Ostrovsky and Schwarz (2010), Board and Lu (2016), Gentzkow and
Kamenica (2017a, 2017b), and Li and Norman (2017). Dynamic Bayesian persuasion is examined in
Au (2015), Ely et al. (2015), and Ely (2017). Information acquisition and the value of information
in Bayesian persuasion are explored in Gentzkow and Kamenica (2014, 2017c), Kolotilin (2015),
Alonso and Caˆmara (2016a), and Bergemann and Morris (2016).
4Focusing on experiments is with loss of generality in settings with multiple receivers in Bergemann
and Morris (2013), Alonso and Caˆmara (2016c), Mathevet et al. (2017), and Taneva (2016).
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obedience constraints instead of participation constraints.5 The equivalence between
persuasion mechanisms and experiments relies on the majorization theory of Hardy
et al. (1929) and, thus, relates to the equivalence between Bayesian and dominant-
strategy implementation in Manelli and Vincent (2010) and Gershkov et al. (2013).
2. Model
2.1. Setup. There are two players: sender and receiver. The receiver makes a choice
a ∈ A = {0, 1} between action (a = 1) and inaction (a = 0). There are two payoff-
relevant random variables: the state of the world ω ∈ Ω and the receiver’s private
type r ∈ R, where Ω and R are intervals in the real line. Random variables ω and r
are independent and have distributions F and G.
Let the receiver’s and sender’s utilities be
u(ω, r, a) = a · (ω − r),
v (ω, r, a) = a+ ρ (r)u(ω, r, a),
(1)
where ρ is a bounded measurable function.6
The receiver’s utility from inaction (a = 0) is normalized to zero, whereas his utility
from action (a = 1) equals the benefit ω less the private cost r. The sender’s utility
is a weighted sum of the receiver’s utility and action. The sender is biased towards
the receiver’s action but also puts a type-specific weight ρ(r) on the receiver’s utility.
In particular, if the weight ρ is large, then the sender’s and receiver’s interests are
aligned, whereas if the weight is zero, then the sender cares only about whether the
receiver acts or not.
We assume that the set of states is Ω = [0, 1] and E[ω] ∈ (0, 1). Because the optimal
action of the receiver of any type above 1 or below 0 is independent of the state, we
assume that the set of types is R = [0, 1]. These assumptions allow for elegance of
presentation; relaxing them poses no difficulty.
2.2. Persuasion Mechanisms. In order to influence the action taken by the re-
ceiver, the sender can design a mechanism that asks the receiver to report his private
information and sends a message to the receiver conditional on his report and the
realized state.
A persuasion mechanism pi asks the receiver to report rˆ ∈ R and then recommends
him to take one of two actions: for every ω ∈ Ω, it recommends to act (aˆ = 1) with
probability pi (ω, rˆ) and not to act (aˆ = 0) with complementary probability 1−pi (ω, rˆ),
where pi : Ω×R→ [0, 1] is a measurable function.
A persuasion mechanism is incentive compatible if the receiver finds it optimal to
report his true type and to follow the mechanism’s recommendation. Denote the
5Bayesian persuasion with monetary transfers is investigated in Bergemann and Pesendorfer
(2007), Eso¨ and Szentes (2007), Bergemann et al. (2015, 2017a, 2016b), Li and Shi (2016), and
Ho¨rner and Skrzypacz (2016).
6For our analysis, it is sufficient to assume that u(ω, r, a) and v (ω, r, a) are linear in (a transfor-
mation of) the state ω. The unidimensionality of the type r and the linearity of the utilities in the
type are assumed only for elegance of exposition. We further comment on this in Section 3.3, and
refer an interested reader to Appendix C of the Supplemental Material for technical details.
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interim utility of a receiver of type r ∈ R who reports rˆ ∈ R and takes actions
a0 ∈ {0, 1} and a1 ∈ {0, 1} after recommendations aˆ = 0 and aˆ = 1, respectively, by
Upi(r, rˆ, a0, a1) =
∫
Ω
(a0(1− pi(ω, rˆ)) + a1pi(ω, rˆ)) (ω − r)dF (ω).
The interim utility of the truthful (rˆ = r) and obedient (a0 = 0 and a1 = 1) receiver
is equal to
Upi(r) = Upi(r, r, 0, 1) =
∫
Ω
pi(ω, r)(ω − r)dF (ω).
We consider mechanisms that satisfy the incentive compatibility constraint
Upi(r) ≥ Upi(r, rˆ, a0, a1) for all r, rˆ ∈ R and a0, a1 ∈ A. (2)
It is convenient to introduce the notation for the interim utility of the obedient receiver
of type r, who reports rˆ and then obeys the recommendation of the mechanism:
Upi (r, rˆ) = Upi(r, rˆ, 0, 1) = ppi (rˆ)− qpi (rˆ) r,
where qpi (rˆ) is the interim action and ppi (rˆ) is the expected state after action condi-
tional on a report rˆ:
qpi (rˆ) =
∫
Ω
pi(ω, rˆ)dF (ω) and ppi (rˆ) =
∫
Ω
ωpi(ω, rˆ)dF (ω) .
With these notations, we can draw the parallel to the standard mechanism design
problem with transfers, where r is a private value, rˆ is a reported value, qpi(rˆ) is the
probability of transaction, and ppi(rˆ) is the expected monetary transfer. The classical
envelope argument yields the following lemma.
Lemma 1. A mechanism pi is incentive compatible if and only if
qpi is nonincreasing, (3)
Upi (r) =
∫ 1
r
qpi(s)ds, (4)
Upi (0) = E[ω]. (5)
The proof is in the Appendix.
Interestingly, the obedience constraints for the intermediate types are implied by
the boundary conditions, Upi(1) = 0 and Upi(0) = E[ω], and truth telling, Upi(r) ≥
Upi(r, rˆ). To disobey by ignoring the recommendation, that is, to act (not to act)
irrespective of what is recommended, is not better than pretending to be the lowest
type rˆ = 0 (the highest type rˆ = 1, respectively). Due to the linearity of the receiver’s
utility, to misreport and disobey by taking the opposite action to the recommended
one is always inferior to reporting either the lowest type, rˆ = 0, or the highest type,
rˆ = 1, and then following the recommendation.
In our model, there are no transfers, and there are obedience constraints instead
of individual rationality constraints. These differences between our and the standard
environment with transfers translate into the following differences in characterization.
First, there are two boundary conditions, Upi(1) = 0 and Upi(0) = E[ω]:
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(a) We have ω − r ≤ 0 for all ω ∈ Ω = [0, 1] and r = 1. Hence, type 1’s utility is
maximized by not acting for any belief about the state, implying Upi(1) = 0.
This is (4) evaluated at r = 1.
(b) We have ω − r ≥ 0 for all ω ∈ Ω = [0, 1] and r = 0. Hence, type 0’s utility
is maximized by acting for any belief about the state, implying Upi(0) = E[ω].
This is (5).
Second, not every pair (q, U) that satisfies conditions (3)–(5) is feasible, that is, a
mechanism pi that implements such a pair need not exist. For example, if F assigns
probability 1 on ω = 1/2, then every nonincreasing q with
∫ 1
0
q(r)dr = 1/2 satisfies
(3)–(5). Among these functions, q is feasible if and only if it satisfies q(r) = 1 for
r < 1/2 and q(r) = 0 for r > 1/2.
2.3. Experiments. An experiment communicates a one-way message to the receiver
and does not require the receiver to report his type. Formally, an experiment σ sends
to the receiver a random message m from a message space M = [0, 1] that depends
on a realized state ω. Denote by σ(m|ω) the distribution of message m conditional
on state ω.
A persuasion mechanism can be interpreted as a menu of experiments from which
the receiver can freely choose one experiment. For a given mechanism pi, the corre-
sponding menu of experiments is {σrˆ}rˆ∈R, where, conditional on a state ω, an experi-
ment σrˆ sends messages 1 and 0 with probabilities pi(ω, rˆ) and 1−pi(ω, rˆ). Conversely,
by the revelation principle, any equilibrium outcome induced by any menu of exper-
iments offered to the receiver can be replicated by a persuasion mechanism.
For a given experiment σ, each message m induces a posterior belief of the receiver
about the state. Because the receiver’s utility is monotonic in his type, we can identify
every message m with the cutoff type r who is indifferent between the two actions
conditional on receiving this message. An experiment is direct if its messages are
equal to the cutoff types, m = E[ω|m]. Without loss of generality, we focus on direct
experiments (as in, e.g., Kamenica and Gentzkow, 2011).
A persuasion mechanism pi is equivalent to an experiment if, conditional on each
state, the behavior of the receiver as stipulated by pi is a best-reply behavior to the
posterior beliefs generated by some direct experiment σ,
pi(ω, r) ∈ [1− σ(r|ω), 1− σ(r−|ω)] for all ω ∈ Ω and all r ∈ R, (6)
where σ(r−|ω) denotes the left limit of σ(.|ω) at r. To understand (6), note that,
upon receiving a direct message m, every type r < m strictly prefers to choose a = 1,
and type r = m is indifferent between a = 0 and a = 1 and may optimally choose
any lottery over the two actions. Consequently, the probability that type r acts
conditional on state ω can take any value in the interval [1− σ(r|ω), 1− σ(r−|ω)].
3. Implementation Equivalence
In this section, we characterize the pairs of the interim utility U and action q
implementable by persuasion mechanisms, and show that the same pairs of the interim
utility and action are implementable by experiments.
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This is a step towards solving the sender’s optimization problem, because the
sender’s interim utility Vpi(r) when the receiver’s type is r is a weighted sum of the
receiver’s interim utility and action,
Vpi(r) =
∫
Ω
(1 + ρ(r)(ω − r))pi(ω, r)dF (ω) = qpi(r) + ρ(r)Upi(r). (7)
3.1. Bounds on Receiver’s Interim Utility. Consider two simple mechanisms.
The full disclosure mechanism informs the receiver about the state, so the receiver
acts (pi(ω, r) = 1) if ω > r and does not act (pi(ω, r) = 0) if ω < r. Therefore, the
interim utility is
U (r) =
∫ 1
r
(ω − r) dF (ω) .
The no disclosure mechanism does not convey any information to the receiver, so the
receiver acts if E[ω] > r and does not act if E[ω] < r. Therefore, the interim utility is
U (r) = max {E[ω]− r, 0} .
Thus, U(r) is the receiver’s interim utility based on the prior information about ω as
given by F , whereas U(r) is the receiver’s interim utility if he observes ω.
Note that every mechanism pi must satisfy
U(r) ≤ Upi(r) ≤ U(r) for all r ∈ R. (8)
The left-hand side inequality of (8) is implied by incentive compatibility: the receiver
cannot be better off by ignoring the sender’s recommendation. The right-hand side
inequality of (8) is the feasibility constraint : the receiver’s utility cannot exceed the
utility attained under full disclosure of ω.
3.2. Implementable Interim Utility and Action. The receiver’s interim utility
U and action q are implementable if there exists an incentive-compatible persuasion
mechanism pi such that U(r) = Upi(r) and q(r) = qpi(r) for all r ∈ R. Moreover, U
and q are implementable by an experiment if pi is equivalent to an experiment.
Let U be the set of all convex functions bounded by U and U (see Fig. 1).
Theorem 1. The following statements are equivalent:
(a) U is a convex function between U and U ;
(b) U is implementable;
(c) U is implementable by an experiment.
Proof. Observe that (a) states the necessary conditions for the implementation of U .
The incentive-compatibility constraint requires the convexity of U by Lemma 1, and
the feasibility constraint (8) requires U(r) ≤ U(r) ≤ U(r). Hence, (b) ⇒ (a). Also,
the implication (c)⇒ (b) is trivial by definition. It remains to show that (a)⇒ (c).
Let U ∈ U . Define H(r) = 1 +U ′(r+), where U ′(r+) denotes the right-derivative of
U at r, so that H is right-continuous. Since U(0) = U(0) = E[ω] and U ′(0+) = −1, we
have H(0) = 0; since U(1) = U(1) = 0 and U ′(1+) = U
′
(1+) = 0, we have H(1) = 1.
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U(r)
U(r)
r
U(r)
Figure 1. Set U contains every convex function between U and U .
Also, since U is convex, H is nondecreasing. Hence, H is a distribution function.
Next, observe that∫ 1
r
(1−H(s))ds = U(r) ≤ U(r) =
∫ 1
r
(1− F (s))ds (9)
for all r, with equality at r = 0, because U(0) = U(0) = E[ω]. That is, F is a mean-
preserving spread of H. By Blackwell (1953), there exists a joint distribution function
P (ω,m) such that the marginal distribution of ω is F , the marginal distribution of
m is H, and EP [ω|m] = m for all m.
Now, consider an experiment σ(m|ω) = P (m|ω). By construction, E[ω|m] = m for
all m of σ, and the probability that σ generates message m ≤ x, for any given value x,
is H(x). Thus, σ induces type r to act with probability qσ(r) ∈ [1−H(r), 1−H(r−)],
where indeterminacy arises at each discontinuity point r of H, because type r is
indifferent between the two actions and can, therefore, optimally choose any lottery
over these actions. Finally, (4) implies that σ implements U . 
Theorem 1 yields the following characterization of implementable interim actions.
Corollary 1. The following statements are equivalent:
(a) q is a nonincreasing function that satisfies∫ 1
r
q(ω)dω ≤
∫ 1
r
(1− F (ω))dω for all r, with equality at r = 0; (10)
(b) q is implementable;
(c) q is implementable by an experiment.
The heart of the characterization result, Theorem 1, is that every implementable
pair of U and q is implementable by an experiment. This result relies on the following
connection between the Mirrlees (1971) representation of incentive compatibility and
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the Blackwell (1953) representation of garbling. Incentive compatibility (4) and feasi-
bility (8) imply that every implementable interim utility U and action q must satisfy
the requirements in parts (a) of Theorem 1 and Corollary 1. Part (a) of Corollary 1
states that F is a mean-preserving spread of 1−q. But any such q can be implemented
by an appropriate garbling of the full disclosure experiment.7 Because each interim
utility U is pinned down by some interim action q through (4), we obtain the result.
We now highlight a connection to the literature on the equivalence of Bayesian
and dominant-strategy incentive compatibility in linear environments with trans-
fers (Manelli and Vincent, 2010, and Gershkov et al., 2013). Using Gutmann et
al. (1991), Gershkov et al. (2013) show that for a given monotonic expected alloca-
tion (Bayesian incentive-compatible mechanism) there exists a monotonic ex-post al-
location (dominant-strategy incentive-compatible mechanism) that delivers the same
expected allocation. Relatedly, using Blackwell (1953), we show that for a given non-
increasing q that satisfies (10) there exists an incentive compatible pi(ω, r) that is
nonincreasing in r for each ω ∈ Ω and satisfies∫
Ω
pi(ω, r)dF (ω) = q(r) for each r ∈ R.
Since pi(r, ω) ∈ [0, 1] is nonincreasing and, w.l.o.g., right-continuous in r, we can
interpret the function σ(r|ω) = 1−pi(r, ω) as a distribution of messages for every given
state ω. That is, σ is an experiment, and mechanism pi is equivalent to experiment
σ. Both Blackwell (1953) and Gutmann et al. (1991) are based on the majorization
theory initiated by Hardy et al. (1929).
3.3. Discussion. We now discuss extensions and limitations of Theorem 1, when the
sender’s and receiver’s utility functions are nonlinear and the receiver has more than
two actions.
Linearity in Type. The result in Theorem 1 can be easily extended to the case
where the utilities are linear in (a transformation of) the state ω, but are arbitrary
functions of the type r. Suppose that
u(ω, r, a) = a · (c(r) + b(r)d(ω)) and v(ω, r, a) = a+ ρ(r)u(ω, r, a),
where b, c, d, and ρ are bounded measurable functions. In addition, assume that
b(r) is strictly positive, and c(r)/b(r) is strictly monotone.8 All other details of the
model remain as in Section 2; in particular, the receiver chooses one of two actions,
a ∈ {0, 1}. We now demonstrate how a change of variables gives back the problem
formulated in Section 2. Define new variables
ω˜ = d(ω) and r˜ = −c(r)/b(r),
7Suppose that an experiment induces the distribution of posterior means equal to H = 1 − q.
It is optimal for a type r to act if the posterior mean is at least r, which occurs with probability
1−H(r) = q(r). Therefore, this experiment implements q.
8These assumptions are unnecessary for our results and are made for elegance of exposition. A
more general case of utility functions linear in ω is analyzed in Appendix C of the Supplemental
Material.
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and let
u˜(ω˜, r˜, a) =
u(ω, r, a)
b(r)
= a ·
(
c(r)
b(r)
+ d(ω)
)
= a · (ω˜ − r˜) .
The utility of each type r is now multiplied by the factor 1/b(r), which has no effect
on the optimal choice of action a ∈ {0, 1} for this type. Next, define ρ˜(r˜) = ρ(r)b(r)
and let
v˜(ω˜, r˜, a) = v(ω, r, a) = a+ ρ(r)b(r)
u(ω, r, a)
b(r)
= a+ ρ˜(r˜)u˜(ω˜, r˜, a).
Thus, after this change of variables, the sender’s and receiver’s utilities have the
functional forms identical to (1).
Linearity in State. The linearity of the utilities in (a transformation of) the state
implies that a posterior distribution of the state can be summarized into a scalar, the
posterior mean. For any message of any experiment, the receiver acts if and only if his
type is below the cutoff equal to the posterior mean state conditional on that message.
An experiment induces a probability distribution over these cutoffs. A persuasion
mechanism, which is a menu of experiments, induces a compound distribution over
cutoffs, which is itself an experiment.
Without the linearity in the state, a posterior distribution of the state cannot be
summarized into a scalar. Even if the receiver’s utility is increasing in the state and
decreasing in the type, different types of the receiver may have different attitudes to
risk. Thus, there may be a value of screening types by offering the receiver a menu
of experiments.
For example, consider an experiment that sends one message if ω ≥ ω′ and another
message otherwise. For a type r′ that is exactly indifferent between a = 0 and
a = 1 upon learning that ω ≥ ω′, this experiment leaves type r′ with zero surplus
and uniquely maximizes the probability that type r′ acts. Under this experiment, a
nearby type r′′ < r′ also acts if and only if ω ≥ ω′. Without linearity, it is possible
to design another experiment, preferred by r′′ but not by r′, which induces type r′′
to act with a different probability. Thus, the persuasion mechanism corresponding
to the menu of these two experiments implements the interim actions that cannot be
implemented by any experiment.
In Appendix B of the Supplemental Material, we formulate the model in which
the utilities are nonlinear in the state, characterize persuasion mechanisms that are
equivalent to experiments, and demonstrate that the equivalence of implementation
by persuasion mechanisms and by experiments generally fails.
Binary Action Space. The assumption that the receiver chooses one of two
actions is crucial for Theorem 1 to hold. Relaxing this assumption will affect the
result in two ways.
First, the number of actions affects the complexity of the obedience constraints.
With two actions, there are only two relevant ways to disobey a mechanism, by
ignoring the mechanism’s message and either always act or never act. However,
the outcomes of these deviations can be achieved by reporting the extreme types,
rˆ = 0 and rˆ = 1, which always act and never act, respectively. Thus, the incentive
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to report the type truthfully automatically implies obedience. With more than two
actions, there are more ways to disobey than just ignore the messages. The obedience
constraints are nontrivial and are not implied by the truthtelling. Consequently, the
implication (a) ⇒ (b) of Theorem 1 (that every convex function between U and
U is implementable) is false, because the obedience constraints impose additional
necessary conditions for implementability.
Second, with more than two actions, there exist outcomes implementable by per-
suasion mechanisms but not by experiments. For example, suppose that there are
three actions available to the receiver, A = {0, 1, 2}, and consider a persuasion mecha-
nism described by a menu of experiments that send binary messages, “high” or “low”.
Under this mechanism, each type of the receiver will choose a preferred experiment
from the menu, and then choose one of two best-response actions to the messages.
Generally, this mechanism is not implementable by an experiment. If an experi-
ment sends a binary message (the same for all types), then, generally, there will be
types who would have chosen a different experiment from the menu and would have
acted differently under the original persuasion mechanism. If, instead, an experiment
sends multiple messages, then, generally, there will be types that have more than
two best-response actions to those messages, thus behaving differently than under
the original mechanism. Consequently, the implication (b)⇒ (c) of Theorem 1 (that
every implementable U is implementable by an experiment) does not hold.
In Appendix A of the Supplemental Material, we formulate the model with multiple
actions of the receiver, characterize the implementable receiver’s interim utilities, and
show that the sender can generally implement a strictly larger set of the receiver’s
interim utilities and actions by persuasion mechanisms than by experiments.
4. Optimal Mechanisms
In this section, we use Theorem 1 to characterize the persuasion mechanisms that
are optimal for the sender under additional smoothness assumptions. We assume that
the weight ρ in the sender’s utility is continuous in the receiver’s type and that the
distribution of types G admits a continuously differentiable density g.
4.1. Sender’s Problem. The sender seeks an incentive-compatible persuasion mech-
anism pi that maximizes ∫
R
Vpi(r)dG(r),
where Vpi(r) is the sender’s interim utility when the receiver’s type is r, as defined
by (7). The following lemma is a useful tool for finding optimal persuasion mecha-
nisms. It expresses the sender’s expected utility as a function of the receiver’s interim
utility.
Lemma 2. For every incentive-compatible mechanism pi,∫
R
Vpi(r)dG(r) = g(0)E[ω] +
∫
R
Upi(r)I(r)dr,
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where
I(r) = g′(r) + ρ(r)g(r) for all r ∈ R.
This formulation of the sender’s objective is similar to the Myerson (1981) for-
mulation of the seller’s objective in terms of virtual valuations. Both formulations
account for the designer’s biased preferences and information rents left to the pri-
vately informed parties. Lemma 2 relies on the assumption that the sender’s utility
is a weighted sum of the receiver’s utility and action. By incentive compatibility
(Lemma 1), the receiver’s interim action is the derivative of his interim utility. The
lemma then follows by integration by parts.
Proof. Observe that, by (4) and (7), we have∫
R
Vpi(r)dG(r) =
∫
R
(qpi(r) + ρ(r)Upi(r)) g(r)dr =
∫
R
(−U ′pi(r+) + ρ(r)Upi(r)) g(r)dr.
Using integration by parts, we obtain
−
∫
R
U ′pi(r+)g(r)dr = −Upi(r)g(r)
∣∣1
0
+
∫
R
Upi(r)g
′(r)dr.
Since −Upi(r)g(r)
∣∣1
0
= E[ω]g(0) by (5), the lemma follows. 
By Theorem 1, the receiver’s interim utility is implementable by some persuasion
mechanism if and only if it is in U . Hence, the sender’s problem can be expressed as
max
U∈U
∫
R
U(r)I(r)dr. (11)
We say that U is optimal if it solves the above problem. For a given optimal U , the
corresponding optimal experiment is defined by the distribution H of the posterior
mean state,
H(r) = 1 + U ′(r+) for all r ∈ [0, 1].
4.2. Structure of Optimal Mechanisms. We characterize the structure of optimal
mechanisms under the assumption that function I is nonzero almost everywhere and
changes sign n ≥ 0 times.9 Let {r1, r2, . . . , rn} ⊂ (0, 1) be the set of types at which I
changes its sign, and let r0 = 0 and rn+1 = 1.
Clearly, as follows from (11), on any interval (ri, ri+1) where I(r) is positive, for
any given values of U(ri) and U(ri+1), the optimality requires that U(r) is pointwise
maximized subject to feasibility (U ≤ U) and the convexity of U on [ri, ri+1]. That is,
the interim utility U on [ri, ri+1] is a straight line that passes through the endpoints
U(ri) and U(ri+1), unless U(r) = U(r) for some r ∈ [ri, ri+1], as shown in Fig. 2.
Formally,
(P1) On every interval (ri, ri+1) where I(r) is positive, U is the greatest convex
function that passes through the endpoints U(ri) and U(ri+1) and does not
exceed U .
9If there are intervals where I(r) = 0, then on those intervals the sender is indifferent about the
choice of U . Hence, multiple solutions emerge in this case. Characterization of these solutions is a
straightforward but tedious extension of the result in this section.
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0
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r
U(r)
− + −
I(r)
0
1
U(r)
r
U(r)
− + −
I(r)
Tangency points
of U and U
Figure 2. The optimal interim utility on the interval where I(r) is positive.
0
1
r
U(r)
+ +−
I(r)
Figure 3. The optimal interim utility on the interval where I(r) is negative.
Similarly, on any interval (ri, ri+1) where I(r) is negative, for any given pairs of
(U(ri), U
′(ri)) and (U(ri+1), U ′(ri+1)), the optimality requires that U(r) is pointwise
minimized subject to U ≥ U and the convexity of U on [ri, ri+1]. That is, the interim
utility U on [ri, ri+1] is an upper envelope of two straight lines that pass through the
endpoints U(ri) and U(ri+1) and have slopes U
′(ri) and U ′(ri+1), as shown in Fig. 3.
Formally,
(P2) On every interval (ri, ri+1) where I(r) is negative, U is piecewise linear with
at most one kink and satisfies
U(r) = max
{
U(ri) + U
′(ri)(r − ri), U(ri+1) + U ′(ri+1)(r − ri+1)
}
.
Therefore, we can reduce the sender’s problem (11) of optimization on the function
space U to an n-variable optimization problem. The optimal U is pinned down by
properties (P1) and (P2) within each interval (ri, ri+1) where the sign of I is constant.
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Thus, the optimal U is fully defined by the utility values at the points {r1, ..., rn}
where I changes its sign.
For every vector y¯ = (y1, ..., yn) ∈ Rn, consider the set of all U ∈ U that satisfy
U(ri) = yi for all i = 1, ..., n. If this set is nonempty, the properties (P1) and (P2)
uniquely determine the optimal U on this set, denoted by U∗y¯ . For completeness,
define U∗y¯ = U if this set is empty. Thus, we obtain:
Theorem 2. The sender’s problem (11) is an n-variable optimization problem,
max
y¯∈Rn
∫
R
U∗y¯ (r)I(r)dr.
Properties (P1) and (P2) imply that the optimal U is piecewise linear except for the
intervals where U(r) = U(r), as shown in Figs. 2–3. Recall that, for a given optimal
U , the corresponding optimal experiment induces the distribution of the mean state
given by H(r) = 1 + U ′(r+) for all r ∈ [0, 1]. Therefore, the intervals on which U is
linear correspond to constant H (i.e., zero density). The kinks of U correspond to
the mass points of the distribution equal to the difference between the right and left
derivatives of U at those points. The intervals on which U(r) = U(r) correspond to
the full disclosure intervals, H(r) = F (r).
Example 1. Suppose that I(r) = g′(r) +ρ(r)g(r) crosses the horizontal axis at most
once and from above. This is the case, for instance, if the density g(r) is single-peaked
and ρ(r) = 0. Then, Theorem 2 implies that there exists a threshold ω∗ such that
the optimal experiment reveals the state if it is below ω∗ and sends the same pooling
message for all states above ω∗.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we study the model of persuasion of a privately informed receiver in
linear environments, and show the equivalence of persuasion by experiments and by
persuasion mechanisms. A privately informed receiver can be interpreted as a random
draw from a heterogeneous population of receivers. Within this interpretation, a per-
suasion mechanism establishes a private communication channel with each individual
in the population; it asks each individual to report his type, and returns a private
message about the state. In contrast, an experiment broadcasts the same message
to the entire population. Our equivalence result can be viewed as the equivalence
between persuasion via private communication to receivers and by broadcasting in-
formation to the whole population. In particular, so long as the receivers’ types are
unobserved by the sender, there is no loss of optimality in publicity of messages and
free information sharing among the receivers.
Within the above interpretation, it would be natural to assume that the receivers’
payoffs depend not only on their own actions, but also on collective actions in the
population, thus being affected by network externalities. This extension is beyond
the scope of this paper and it is left open for future research.
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Appendix. Proof of Lemma 1
Necessity. Incentive compatibility (2) requires that for each rˆ > r, both r and rˆ
prefer truth telling
Upi(r) ≥ Upi(r, rˆ) = Upi(rˆ) + qpi(rˆ)(rˆ − r),
Upi(rˆ) ≥ Upi(rˆ, r) = Upi(r) + qpi(r)(r − rˆ).
Therefore,
−qpi(r)(rˆ − r) ≤ Upi(rˆ)− Upi(r) ≤ −qpi(rˆ)(rˆ − r),
which implies (3). Letting rˆ → r and then integrating from r to 1 gives
Upi(1)− Upi(r) = −
∫ 1
r
qpi(s)ds.
Also, observe that type r = 1 can secure his maximal attainable utility of 0 by always
acting (irrespective of a recommendation); so Upi(1) = 0 and (4) follows. Finally,
the maximal attainable utility of type r = 0 is E[ω], which can be secured by never
acting; so (5) follows.
Sufficiency. It remains to show that (3)–(5) imply (2). If either r˜ ≥ rˆ ≥ r or
r˜ ≤ rˆ ≤ r, then (3) and (4) imply that
Upi(r, rˆ) = Upi(r) + qpi(rˆ)(rˆ − r) =
∫ 1
rˆ
qpi(s)ds+ qpi(rˆ)(rˆ − r)
≥
∫ r˜
rˆ
qpi(r˜)ds+
∫ 1
r˜
qpi(s)ds+ qpi(r˜)(rˆ − r)
=
∫ 1
r˜
qpi(s)ds+ qpi(r˜)(r˜ − r) = Upi(r, r˜),
meaning that Upi(r, rˆ) is single-peaked in rˆ, with the peak located at rˆ = r. Therefore,
Upi(r) ≥ Upi(r, rˆ) = Upi(r, rˆ, 0, 1) for all r, rˆ ∈ R.
Moreover, letting rˆ = 1 and rˆ = 0 gives
Upi(r) ≥ Upi(r, 1) = Upi(1) + qpi(1)(1− r) ≥ 0 = Upi(r, rˆ, 0, 0) for all r, rˆ ∈ R,
Upi(r) ≥ Upi(r, 0) = Upi(0)− qpi(0)r ≥ E[ω]− r = Upi(r, rˆ, 1, 1) for all r, rˆ ∈ R.
Thus, we are left to show that Upi(r) ≥ Upi(r, rˆ, 1, 0) for all r, rˆ ∈ R. Notice that
Upi(r, rˆ, 1, 0) =
∫
Ω
(1− pi(ω, r))(ω − r)dF (ω) = E[ω]− r − Upi(r, rˆ).
Since Upi(r, rˆ) is single-peaked, we have
Upi(r, rˆ, 1, 0) ≤ E[ω]− r −min{Upi(r, 0), Upi(r, 1)} = max{0,E[ω]− r}
= max{Upi(r, 1), Upi(r, 0)} ≤ Upi(r) for all r, rˆ ∈ R.
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Supplementary Material
Supplement to “Persuasion of a Privately Informed Receiver”
Appendix A. Multiple Actions
In this Appendix, we allow the receiver to make a choice among multiple actions.
We characterize the implementable receiver’s interim utilities and show that the
sender can generally implement a strictly larger set of the receiver’s interim utili-
ties by persuasion mechanisms than by experiments. We also formulate the sender’s
optimization problem and show that the sender can achieve a strictly higher expected
utility by persuasion mechanisms than by experiments.
A.1. Preferences. Let A = {0, 1, ..., n} be a finite set of actions available to the re-
ceiver. The state ω ∈ Ω = [0, 1] and the receiver’s type r ∈ R = [0, 1] are independent
and have distributions F and G. We continue to assume that the receiver’s utility is
linear in the state for every type and every action.
It is convenient to define the receiver’s and sender’s utilities, u(ω, r, a) and v(ω, r, a),
recursively by the utility difference between each two consecutive actions. For each
a ∈ {1, . . . , n},
u(ω, r, a)− u(ω, r, a− 1) = ba(r)(ω − xa(r)),
v(ω, r, a)− v(ω, r, a− 1) = za(r) + ρ(r)(u(ω, r, a)− u(ω, r, a− 1)),
and the utilities from action a = 0 are normalized to zero, u(ω, r, 0) = v(ω, r, 0) = 0
for all ω and all r.
For each a ∈ {1, . . . , n}, the receiver’s and sender’s utilities can be expressed as
u(ω, r, a) =
(∑a
i=1
bi(r)
)
ω −
(∑a
i=1
bi(r)xi(r)
)
v(ω, r, a) =
(∑a
i=1
zi(r)
)
+ ρ(r)u(ω, r, a).
We assume that ba(r) > 0 for all r and all a ∈ {1, . . . , n}. This assumption means
that every type r prefers higher actions in higher states. Note that xa(r) is the cutoff
state at which the receiver of type r is indifferent between two consecutive actions
a− 1 and a. Define x0(r) = −∞ and xn+1(r) =∞.
Denote by x¯a(r) the cutoff truncated to the unit interval,
x¯a(r) = max
{
0,min
{
1, xa(r)
}}
.
We assume that the cutoffs are ordered on [0, 1] such that
x¯1(r) ≤ x¯2(r) ≤ ... ≤ x¯n(r) for all r ∈ R.
Thus, type r optimally chooses action a on the interval of states (x¯a(r), x¯a+1(r)).
10
10This assumption ensures that the actions that can be optimal for type r are consecutive. If
actions a − 1 and a + 1 are optimal for type r under states ω′ and ω′′, then there must be a state
between ω′ and ω′′ where action a is optimal. This assumption simplifies the exposition. Relaxing
this assumption poses no difficulty: it will only require us for each type r to omit from the analysis
the actions that are never optimal for this type.
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A.2. Experiments. Because the receiver’s utility is linear in the state for every type
and every action, every experiment σ can be equivalently described by the probability
that the posterior mean state is below a given value x ∈ Ω,
Hσ(x) =
∫
Ω
σ(x|ω)dF (ω).
In fact, as in Blackwell (1951), Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970), and Gentzkow and
Kamenica (2016), it is convenient to describe an experiment by a convex function
Cσ : R→ R defined as
Cσ(x) =
∫ ∞
x
(1−Hσ(m))dm.
Observe that by (9), for every experiment σ, we have Cσ(r) = Uσ(r) for all r, where
Uσ(r) is the receiver’s interim utility under σ in the problem of Section 2, with two
actions and u(ω, r, a) = a(ω − r). Hence, by Theorem 1, the set of all Cσ is equal to
C = {C : C ≤ C ≤ C and C is convex},
where C and C correspond to the full and no disclosure experiments,
C(x) =
∫ ∞
x
(1− F (m))dm,
C(x) = max{E[ω]− x, 0}.
A.3. Implementable Interim Utilities. The expected utility of type r under ex-
periment σ is equal to
Uσ(r) =
∫
Ω
(
max
a∈A
u(m, r, a)
)
dHσ(m) for all r ∈ R.
Proposition 1. U is implementable by an experiment if and only if there exists C ∈ C
such that
U(r) =
n∑
a=1
ba(r)C(xa(r)) for all r ∈ R. (12)
Proof. The receiver’s interim utility under experiment σ is
Uσ(r) =
n∑
a=0
∫ xa+1(r)
xa(r)
u(m, r, a)dHσ(m) =
n∑
a=1
∫ ∞
xa(r)
ba(r)(m− xa(r))dHσ(m),
where we used u(m, r, 0) = 0. For each a ∈ {1, . . . , n}, integration by parts yields∫ ∞
xa(r)
ba(r)(m− xa(r))dHσ(m) = −ba(r)(m− xa(r))(1−Hσ(m))
∣∣∣∞
xa(r)
+ ba(r)
∫ ∞
xa(r)
(1−Hσ(m))dm = ba(r)Cσ(xa(r)).
Summing up the above over a ∈ {1, . . . , n} yields (12).
PERSUASION OF A PRIVATELY INFORMED RECEIVER 3
It follows from Section A.2 that the set of the receiver’s interim utilities imple-
mentable by experiments is equal to the set of functions that satisfy (12) for every
C ∈ C. 
A persuasion mechanism can be described by a (possibly, infinite) menu of exper-
iments, Σ. The receiver of type r chooses one experiment from the menu and then
observes messages only from this experiment. Obviously, the receiver chooses the
experiment that maximizes his expected utility,
UΣ(r) = max
σ∈Σ
Uσ(r) for all r ∈ R.
By Proposition 1, it is immediate that the receiver’s interim utility U is imple-
mentable if and only if there exists a menu CΣ ⊂ C such that
U(r) = max
C∈CΣ
{
n∑
a=1
ba(r)C(xa(r))
}
for all r ∈ R.
Theorem 1 shows that the sender can implement the same set of receiver’s interim
utilities by experiments as by persuasion mechanisms. With more than two actions,
however, the sender can generally implement a strictly larger set of interim utilities
by persuasion mechanisms than by experiments, as shown in Example 2.
a = 0
ω
a = 1
a = 2
x1(r
′) x1(r′′) x2(r′) x2(r′′)x1(r∗) x2(r∗)
Figure 4. The utility of type r∗ in Example 1.
Example 2. Let A = {0, 1, 2}, F admit a strictly positive density, and u(ω, r, a) be
continuous in r for all ω and all a. Furthermore, suppose that there exist two types
r′ < r′′, such that for all r ∈ (r′, r′′),
0 < x1 (r
′) < x1 (r) < x1 (r′′) < x2 (r′) < x2 (r) < x2 (r′′) < 1.
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Consider a persuasion mechanism consisting of the menu of two experiments repre-
sented by partitions {P ′, P ′′}, where P ′ and P ′′ are the first-best partitions for types
r′ and r′′,
P ′ = {[0, x1 (r′)) , [x1 (r′) , x2 (r′)) , [x2 (r′) , 1]} ,
P ′′ = {[0, x1 (r′′)) , [x1 (r′′) , x2 (r′′)) , [x2 (r′′) , 1]} .
Types r′ and r′′ choose, respectively, P ′ and P ′′ and get their maximum possible
utilities U (r′) and U (r′′). By the continuity of u (ω, r, a) in r, there exists a type
r∗ ∈ (r′, r′′) who is indifferent between choosing P ′ and P ′′. By this indifference,
L1 (P
′) + L2 (P ′) = L1 (P ′′) + L2 (P ′′) ,
where, for each a ∈ {1, 2},
La (P
′) =
∫ xa(r′)
xa(r∗)
(
u(ω, r∗, a)− u(ω, r∗, a− 1)
)
dF (ω)
denotes the utility loss of type r∗ from using cutoff xa (r′) rather than his first-best
cutoff xa (r
∗) to decide between actions a− 1 and a. Analogously, for each a ∈ {1, 2},
we define La (P
′′).
Fig. 4 illustrates this example. The three blue lines depict the utility of the receiver
of type r∗ from taking action a, u(ω, r∗, a), for each a = 0, 1, 2. The kinked solid blue
line is the utility of type r∗ from taking the optimal action, maxa∈{0,1,2} u(ω, r∗, a).
In Fig. 4, the loss of type r∗ from experiment P ′ relative to the first best, L1 (P ′) +
L2 (P
′), is the total area of the two shaded triangles (assuming that ω is uniformly
distributed). Similarly, the loss of type r∗ from experiment P ′′ relative to the first
best, L1 (P
′′) + L2 (P ′′), is the total area of the two hatched triangles. For type r∗,
these shaded and hatched areas are equal, so type r∗ is indifferent between the two
experiments.
An experiment that gives the maximum possible utilities U (r′) and U (r′′) to types
r′ and r′′ must at least communicate the common refinement of partitions P ′ and P ′′.
Therefore, the utility of type r∗ under such an experiment is at least
U (r∗)−min {L1 (P ′) , L1 (P ′′)} −min {L2 (P ′) , L2 (P ′′)} ,
which is strictly larger than his utility under the persuasion mechanism,
U (r∗)− L1 (P ′)− L2 (P ′) ,
unless L1 (P
′) = L1 (P ′′) and L2 (P ′) = L2 (P ′′).
In Fig. 4, for type r∗, the loss L1 (P ′′) (left hatched triangle) is smaller than the
loss L1 (P
′) (left shaded triangle). Similarly, the loss L2 (P ′) (right shaded triangle)
is smaller than the loss L2 (P
′′) (right hatched triangle). Hence, the total loss is
smaller under the experiment that is the coarsest common refinement of P ′ and P ′′
(the area of the smaller shaded and hatched triangles) than under either experiment
P ′ or experiment P ′′.
PERSUASION OF A PRIVATELY INFORMED RECEIVER 5
A.4. Sender’s Problem. In this section, we impose the following additional as-
sumptions. For each a ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n}, function xa(r) is strictly increasing, and its
range contains Ω. Let function ra(x) be the inverse of function xa(r). Moreover, for
each a ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n}, function za(r) is differentiable, and function G(ra(x)) is twice
differentiable.
For a given experiment σ, the sender’s expected utility conditional on the receiver’s
type being r is11
Vσ(r) = ρ(r)U(r) +
n∑
a=1
( a∑
i=1
zi(r)
)(
Hσ(xa+1(r))−Hσ(xa(r))
)
.
We now express the sender’s expected utility as a function of Cσ, and all the model
parameters are summarized in function I, the same way as in Lemma 2 in Section 4.
Lemma 3. For every experiment σ,∫
R
Vσ(r)dG(r) = K +
∫
Ω
Cσ(x)I(x)dx,
where K is a constant independent of σ and
I(x) =
n∑
a=1
(
d
dx
(
za(ra(x))
d
dx
G(ra(x))
)
+ ρ(ra(x))ba(ra(x))
d
dx
G(ra(x))
)
.
Proof. We have
n∑
a=1
( a∑
i=1
zi(r)
)(
Hσ(xa+1(r))−Hσ(xa(r))
)
=
n∑
a=1
za(r)(1−Hσ(xa(r)))
= −
n∑
a=1
za(r)C
′
σ(xa(r)),
where we used xn+1(r) =∞ (hence, Hσ(xn+1(r)) = 1) and 1−Hσ(x) = −C ′σ(x). By
Proposition 1, we, thus, obtain
V (r) = ρ(r)U(r) +
n∑
a=1
( a∑
i=1
zi(r)
)(
Hσ(xa(r))−Hσ(xa+1(r))
)
= ρ(r)U(r)−
n∑
a=1
za(r)C
′
σ(xa(r)) =
n∑
a=1
(
ρ(r)ba(r)Cσ(xa(r))− za(r)C ′σ(xa(r))
)
.
11For each r where Hσ(xa+1(r)) is discontinuous, this formula assumes that type r breaks the
indifference in favor of action a if the posterior mean state is xa+1(r). This assumption is innocuous
because G admits a density, and there are at most countably many discontinuities of Hσ.
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Fix a ∈ {1, . . . , n} and define the variable x = xa(r). Hence, r = ra(x). Using this
variable change, we have∫
R
(
ρ(r)ba(r)Cσ(xa(r))− za(r)C ′σ(xa(r))
)
dG(r)
= Kˆa +
∫
Ω
(
ρ(ra(x))ba(ra(x))Cσ(x)− za(ra(x))C ′σ(x)
)
dG(ra(x)),
where Kˆa is a constant independent of σ because Ω = [0, 1] ⊂ [xa(0), xa(1)], and, for
all σ and all x /∈ Ω, we have Cσ(x) = max{0,E[ω]− x}. Now we integrate by parts∫
Ω
za(ra(x))C
′
σ(x)dG(ra(x)) = K˜a −
∫
Ω
Cσ(x)
d
dx
(
za(ra(x))
d
dx
G(ra(x))
)
dx
= K˜a −
∫
Ω
C(x) d
dx
(
za(ra(x))
d
dx
G(ra(x))
)
dx,
where K˜a is a constant independent of σ because, for all σ, we have Cσ(0) = E[ω]
and Cσ(1) = 0. Thus, we obtain∫
R
(
ρ(r)ba(r)Cσ(xa(r))− za(r)C ′σ(xa(r))
)
dG(r)
= Ka +
∫
Ω
(
ρ(ra(x))ba(ra(x))
dG(ra(x))
dx
+ d
dx
(
za(ra(x))
d
dx
G(ra(x))
) )
Cσ(x)dx,
where Ka = Kˆa + K˜a. Summing the above over a ∈ {1, . . . , n}, we obtain K +∫
Ω
Cσ(x)I(x)dx, where K =
∑
aKa, and I is defined in Lemma 3. 
The sender’s optimal experiment is described by a function C ∈ C that solves
max
C∈C
∫
Ω
C(x)I(x)dx.
The solutions to this problem are characterized by Theorem 2.
As shown in Section A.3, when the receiver has more than two actions, the sender
can implement a strictly larger set of receiver’s interim utilities by persuasion mech-
anisms than by experiments. We now show that the set of implementable interim
actions is also strictly larger under persuasion mechanisms. Therefore, even if the
sender cares only about the receiver’s action, and not his utility, ρ(r) = 0 for all r,
the sender can achieve a strictly larger expected utility under persuasion mechanisms.
Example 2 (Continued). In addition, let there exist x∗2 ∈ (x1 (r′′) , x2 (r′)) such that
E [ω|ω ≥ x∗2] = x2 (r′′) and E [ω|ω < x∗2] < x1 (r′).
An experiment that maximizes the probability of action a = 2 for type r′′ must
send message x2 (r
′′) if and only if ω ∈ [x∗2, 1]. Under any such experiment, type r′
takes action a = 2 if and only if ω ∈ [x∗2, 1], because for ω < x∗2, this experiment must
generate messages distinct from x2 (r
′′) and, thus, below x∗2, which is in turn below
x2 (r
′).
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Consider now a persuasion mechanism consisting of the menu of two experiments
represented by the following partitions:
P ′ = {[0, x∗2 − ε) \[x1 (r′) , x1 (r′′)), [x1 (r′) , x1 (r′′)), [x∗2 − ε, 1]} ,
P ′′ = {[0, x∗2 − ε) , [x∗2 − ε, x∗2) , [x∗2, 1]}
where ε > 0 is sufficiently small. Type r′ strictly prefers P ′ (to P ′′) because, for
a sufficiently small ε, the benefit of taking action a = 1 (rather than a = 0) on
[x1 (r
′) , x1 (r′′)) exceeds the cost of taking action a = 2 (rather than a = 1) on
[x∗2 − ε, x∗2). Type r′′ is indifferent between P ′′ and P ′, because under both partitions
he weakly prefers to take action a = 0 on [0, x∗2 − ε) and action a = 1 on [x∗2 − ε, 1].
Therefore, under this mechanism, type r′′ takes action a = 2 if and only if ω ∈ [x∗2, 1],
but type r′ takes action a = 2 if and only if ω ∈ [x∗2 − ε, 1]. As shown above, these
probabilities of a = 2 for types r′ and r′′ cannot be achieved by any experiment.
Finally, an optimal persuasion mechanism need not be an experiment. Suppose
that the sender cares only about action a = 2, i.e., ρ(r) = z0(r) = z1(r) = 0 and
z2(r) = 1 for all r. Also suppose that the support of G contains only r
′ and r′′
with r′′ being likely enough, so that the sender’s optimal experiment maximizes the
probability of action a = 2 for type r′′. The persuasion mechanism constructed above
gives a strictly larger expected utility to the sender than any experiment.
Appendix B. Nonlinear Utilities
In this appendix, we allow the sender’s and receiver’s utilities to be nonlinear in the
state. We characterize conditions under which persuasion mechanisms are equivalent
to experiments, and show, in particular, that cutoff mechanisms are equivalent to
experiments. We also show that the equivalence of implementation by persuasion
mechanisms and by experiments generally fails.
B.1. Preferences. As in Section 2, the receiver has two actions, A = {0, 1}, the set
of states is Ω = [0, 1], and the set of receiver’s types is R = [0, 1]. The receiver’s
utility, however, is
u(ω, r, a) = au(ω, r),
where u(ω, r) is differentiable, strictly increasing in ω, and strictly decreasing in r.
We also normalize the utility such that, for each ω ∈ Ω,
u(ω, ω) = 0.
The sender’s utility is
v(ω, r, a) = av(ω, r),
where v(ω, r) is differentiable. State ω and type r are independent and have distri-
butions F and G.12
12Note that if ω and r are correlated, the analysis below applies if we impose strict monotonicity on
function u˜ (ω, r) = u (ω, r) g (r|ω) /g (r) rather than on u, where g(r) and g(r|ω) denote, respectively,
the marginal density of r and the conditional density of r for a given ω. This is because the receiver’s
interim utility under a mechanism pi can be written as U(r) =
∫
Ω
u˜(ω, r)pi(ω, r)dF (ω).
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B.2. Characterization of Experiments. We start with the characterization of
persuasion mechanisms that are equivalent to experiments.
Proposition 2. An incentive-compatible persuasion mechanism pi is equivalent to an
experiment if and only if pi(ω, r) is nonincreasing in r for every ω ∈ Ω.
Intuitively, because for each experiment σ, the distribution σ(r|ω) of r conditional
on each state ω is nondecreasing in r, each pi(ω, r) ∈ [1 − σ(r|ω), 1 − σ(r−|ω)] (see
(6)) is nonincreasing in r.
Proof. Consider a mechanism pi that is equivalent to an experiment σ. Since σ(r|ω)
is a distribution function of r conditional on ω, it is nondecreasing in r for each ω.
Then, by (6), pi(ω, r) is nonincreasing in r for each ω.
Conversely, let pi(r, ω) be nonincreasing in r for all ω. For every ω and r define
σ(r|ω) = 1 − pi(r+, ω), where pi(r+, ω) denotes the right limit of pi(., ω) at r. Since
pi(r+, ω) ∈ [0, 1] is nonincreasing and right-continuous in r, the function σ(r|ω) is
a distribution, which describes the distribution of messages for every given state ω.
Thus, σ is an experiment. It remains to verify that the constructed experiment is
direct and induces the same action by the receiver as mechanism pi, i.e., when the
experiment sends a message r, then type r is indifferent between the two actions. For
all r,
Upi(r) =
∫
Ω
u(ω, r)pi(ω, r)dF (ω) =
∫
Ω
u(ω, r+)pi(ω, r+)dF (ω)
=
∫
Ω
u(ω, r)pi(ω, r+)dF (ω) =
∫
Ω
u(ω, r)(1− σ(r|ω))dF (ω) = Uσ(r),
where the first equality holds by the definition of Upi, the second by the absolute
continuity of Upi (Theorem 1 of Milgrom and Segal, 2002), the third by the continuity
of u in r, the fourth by the definition of σ, and the last by the definition of Uσ for
direct experiments. There exist left and right derivatives of Upi for all r (Theorem 3
of Milgrom and Segal, 2002) that satisfy:
U ′pi(r+) =
∫
Ω
∂u(ω, r)
∂r
pi(r+, ω)dF (ω),
U ′pi(r−) =
∫
Ω
∂u(ω, r)
∂r
pi(r−, ω)dF (ω).
Since Upi(r) = Uσ(r) and σ(r|ω) = 1− pi(r+, ω) for all r, we have
U ′σ(r+) =
∫
Ω
∂u(ω, r)
∂r
(1− σ(r|ω))dF (ω),
U ′σ(r−) =
∫
Ω
∂u(ω, r)
∂r
(1− σ(r−|ω))dF (ω),
showing that type r is indifferent between the two actions upon receiving message r.

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B.3. Binary State. Here we apply Proposition 2 to show that if there are only two
states in the support of the prior F , then every incentive-compatible mechanism is
equivalent to an experiment.
Corollary 2. Let the support of F consist of two states. Then every incentive-
compatible mechanism pi is equivalent to an experiment.
Proof. Consider F whose support consist of two states, without loss of generality,
{0, 1}, and let pi be an incentive-compatible persuasion mechanism. By Proposition
2, it is sufficient to show that pi is nonincreasing in r for all r ∈ (0, 1). Incentive
compatibility implies that for all r, rˆ ∈ (0, 1),∑
ω=0,1
u (ω, r) (pi (ω, r)− pi (ω, r̂)) Pr (ω = 1) ≥ 0. (13)
Rewriting (13) twice, with (r, r̂) = (r2, r1) and (r, r̂) = (r1, r2), yields the inequalities
− u (0, r2)
u (1, r2)
δ (r2, r1, 0) ≤ δ (r2, r1, 1) ≤ −u (0, r1)
u (1, r1)
δ (r2, r1, 0) (14)
where δ (r2, r1, ω) = (pi (ω, r2)− pi (ω, r1)) Pr (ω = 1). Because u (0, r) < 0 and u (1, r) >
0 for r = r1, r2, the monotonicity of u in r implies that
0 < −u (0, r2)
u (1, r2)
≤ −u (0, r1)
u (1, r1)
for r2 ≤ r1. (15)
Combining (14) and (15) gives pi (ω, r2) ≥ pi (ω, r1) if r2 ≤ r1 for each ω = 0, 1. 
Note that if F has a two-point support, then the receiver’s utility is linear in the
state without loss of generality, and, hence, Theorem 1 applies. However, Corollary
2 makes a stronger statement, because it asserts that every incentive-compatible
mechanism is equivalent to an experiment, not just implements the same receiver’s
interim utility.
B.4. Beyond Binary State. Suppose now that the support of the prior F consists
of three states ω1 < ω2 < ω3 and let fi = Pr (ωi) > 0 for i = 1, 2, 3.
When there are at least three states and the utility of the receiver is nonlinear in
(any transformation of) the state, then the posterior distribution of the state induced
by an experiment can no longer be parametrized by a one-dimensional variable—such
as the posterior mean state in the case of linear utilities, the posterior probability of
one of the states in the case of binary-valued state, and the cutoff value in the case
of cutoff mechanisms.
As a consequence, the interim action q(r) and, hence, the sender’s interim utility
V (r) are no longer pinned down by the receiver’s interim utility U(r).
Proposition 3. Let pi1 and pi2 be two mechanisms that are distinct for each r ∈
(ω1, ω3) but implement the same differentiable receiver’s interim utility U . Then, the
interim action q is the same for pi1 and pi2 if and only if there exist functions b, c,
and d such that u (ω, r) = c (r) + b (r) d (ω) for each (ω, r) ∈ {ω1, ω2, ω3} × (ω1, ω3).
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Proof. For all r ∈ (ω1, ω3) and j = 1, 2, we have
U(r) =
3∑
i=1
u (ωi, r) pij (ωi, r) fi,
U ′(r) =
3∑
i=1
∂u (ωi, r)
∂r
pij (ωi, r) fi,
where the first line holds by the definition of U , and the second line by the incentive
compatibility of pi.
The expected action, qpij(r) =
∑3
i=1 pij (ωi, r) fi is the same across j = 1, 2 for each
r if and only if the vectors u (ω, r), ∂u(ω,r)
∂r
, and 1 are linearly dependent for each r.
That is, for each (ω, r) ∈ {ω1, ω2, ω3} × (ω1, ω3), there exist functions γ(r) and µ(r)
such that
∂u (ω, r)
∂r
+ µ (r)u (ω, r) = γ (r) . (16)
The solution of differential equation (16) is given by
u (ω, r) = e
− ∫ rω1 µ(x)dx
(
η (ω) +
∫ r
ω1
γ (x) e
∫ x
ω1
µ(y)dy
dx
)
,
where function η (ω) satisfies the (initial) normalization condition u(ω, ω) = 0. This
completes the proof with b (r) , c (r) , and d (ω) given by
(b (r) , c (r) , d (ω)) =
(
e
− ∫ rω1 µ(x)dx
∫ r
ω1
γ (x) e
∫ x
ω1
µ(y)dy
dx, e
− ∫ rω1 µ(x)dx, η (ω)
)
.

When the receiver’s utility is nonlinear, the sender can implement a strictly larger
set of the receiver’s interim actions by persuasion mechanisms than by experiments.
Therefore, the sender can achieve a strictly higher expected utility by persuasion
mechanisms, even if her utility v is state-independent.
Example 3. Let there be three states, ω1 < ω2 < ω3, and two types of the receiver,
r′ > r′′. Denote u′i = u (ωi, r
′) and u′′i = u (ωi, r
′′) for i ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Assume u′′2 < 0 <
u′3. Moreover, assume u
′
1/u
′′
1 > u
′
2/u
′′
2, which means that point (ω1, u
′′
1) lies above the
dashed line in Fig. 5. Finally, assume that the probability masses (f1, f2, f3) on the
states satisfy f1u
′
1 + f3u
′
3 < 0 and f2u
′
2 + f3u
′
3 < 0.
Let Σ′ be the set of all experiments that maximize the probability of action for
type r′. It is easy to check that any σ′ ∈ Σ′ induces type r′ to act with probability 1
if ω = ω3, with probability −f3u′3/(f2u′2) if ω = ω2, and with probability 0 if ω = ω1.
Observe that by the monotonicity of u in r, each message of σ′ ∈ Σ′ that induces
type r′ to act also induces type r′′ < r′ to act. Moreover, by the definition of Σ′, each
message of σ′ ∈ Σ′ that induces type r′ not to act can be sent only in states ω1 or ω2
where the utility of type r′′ is negative by assumption, u′′1 < u
′′
2 < 0, so type r
′′ does
not act either. Thus, for each experiment σ under which type r′ acts with probability
f3 (1− u′3/u′2) (i.e., σ ∈ Σ′), type r′′ acts with the same probability as type r′.
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Figure 5. The utilities of types r′ (blue) and r′′ (black) in Example 2.
We now construct a persuasion mechanism that also maximizes the probability
that type r′ acts, but induces type r′′ to act with a different probability. Let Σ′′ be
the set of all experiments σ′′ that induce type r′ to act with probability 1 if ω = ω3,
with probability 0 if ω = ω2, and with probability −f3u′3/(f1u′1) if ω = ω1. Consider
a persuasion mechanism that consists of a menu of two experiments {σ′, σ′′} with
σ′ ∈ Σ′ and σ′′ ∈ Σ′′. Notice that type r′ is indifferent between σ′ and σ′′ as he
obtains zero expected utility in either case. However, type r′′ strictly prefers σ′′ to σ′,
because u′1/u
′′
1 > u
′
2/u
′′
2 by assumption. Therefore, under this persuasion mechanism,
type r′ acts with probability f3 (1− u′3/u′2), but type r′′ acts with different probability
f3(1− u′3/u′1).
Finally, when the receiver’s utility is nonlinear, the set of receiver’s interim utili-
ties implementable by persuasion mechanisms (as compared to experiments) can be
strictly larger.
Example 3 (Continued). In addition, let r∗ ∈ (r′, r′′) be such that u′1/u∗1 < u′2/u∗2,
where u∗i = u (ωi, r
∗) for i ∈ {1, 2, 3}.
It is easy to check that Σ′ and Σ′′ are the sets of experiments σ′ and σ′′ that
maximize the utility of types r∗ and r′′, respectively, subject to the constraint that
type r′ gets utility U (r′) = 0. Because Σ′ and Σ′′ do not intersect, no experiment
can achieve the interim utility induced by a persuasion mechanism that consists of
the menu of two experiments σ′ ∈ Σ′ and σ′′ ∈ Σ′′.
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Appendix C. Linear Utilities
This appendix extends our main results to the class of utility functions that are
linear in the state. Specifically, we consider the model defined in Section 2, with the
modification that the utilities are linear in the state and are arbitrary functions of
the receiver’s type.
Let the receiver’s and sender’s utilities be normalized to zero if the receiver does
not act, a = 0, and be linear in the state if the receiver acts, a = 1,
u(ω, r, a) = a · b(ω − t),
v(ω, r, a) = a · (c(ω − t) + d),
where r = (b, c, d, t) ∈ R4 denotes the receiver’s type. The type has distribution G
that admits a differentiable density g, which is strictly positive on a compact set in
R4 and zero everywhere else. The state ω ∈ Ω = [0, 1] is independent of r and has
distribution F .
Let Hσ be the distribution of the posterior mean induced by an experiment σ. As
in Section A.2, it is convenient to describe σ by
Cσ(t) =
∫ ∞
t
(1−Hσ(m))dm.
Proposition 4. For each experiment σ, the receiver’s interim utility is
Uσ(r) = |b|Cσ(t) + min{0, b}(E[ω]− t). (17)
There exist K ∈ R and I : R→ R such that for each σ the sender’s expected utility is
Vσ = K +
∫
t∈R
Cσ(t)I(t)dt. (18)
Proposition 4 allows us to extend Theorems 1 and 2 to this setting. Recall from
Section A.2 that the set of all Cσ is equal to
C = {C : C ≤ C ≤ C and C is convex},
where C and C correspond to the full and no disclosure experiments. Each persuasion
mechanism can be described by a (possibly, infinite) menu of experiments, Σ, which
the receiver chooses from. By (17), for a given menu Σ, the receiver’s interim utility
is
max
σ∈Σ
Uσ(r) = |b|
(
max
σ∈Σ
Cσ(t)
)
+ min{0, b}(E[ω]− t).
Notice that maxσ∈ΣCσ is the upper envelope of convex functions Cσ ∈ C and hence it
is in C. Therefore, by Proposition 4, any implementable pair of the sender’s and re-
ceiver’s expected utilities is implementable by an experiment. Moreover, the sender’s
problem can be expressed as
max
C∈C
∫
R
C(t)I(t)dt,
and Theorem 2 holds with U replaced by C.
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Proof of Proposition 4. Fix a type r = (b, c, d, t) ∈ R4 and evaluate
Uσ(r) =
∫ 1
0
max{0, b(m− t)}dHσ(m).
Clearly, if b = 0, then Uσ(r) = 0. We now consider two cases, b > 0 and b < 0.
Case 1: b > 0. Given a posterior mean m, the receiver acts if and only if t < m.
By integration by parts, the receiver’s interim utility is
Uσ(r) =
∫ 1
t
b(m− t)dHσ(m) = bCσ(t).
Again, by integration by parts, the sender’s interim utility is
Vσ(r) =
∫ 1
t
(c(m− t) + d)dHσ(m) = cCσ(t)− dC ′σ(t).
Case 2: b < 0. Given a posterior mean m, the receiver acts if and only if t ≥ m.
By integration by parts, the receiver’s interim utility is
Uσ(r) =
∫ t
0
b(m− t)dH(m) = −bC(t) + b(E[ω]− t).
Again, by integration by parts, the sender’s interim utility is
Vσ(r) =
∫ t
0
(c(m− t) + d)dH(m) = −cC(t) + dC ′(t) + d+ c(E[ω]− t).
We, thus, obtain (17).
We now show that the sender’s expected utility is given by (18). Let g(b, c, d|t)
be the density of (b, c, d) conditional on t, and let gt(t) be the marginal density of t.
Define
c+(t) =
∫
cg(b, c, d|t)1b>0d(b, c, d),
and
c−(t) =
∫
cg(b, c, d|t)1b<0d(b, c, d).
Similarly, define d+(t) and d−(t).
Fix t and take the expectation with respect to (b, c, d) on the set of b > 0:∫
(b,c,d)
Vσ(b, c, d, t)1b>0g(b, c, d|t)d(b, c, d) = c+(t)Cσ(t)− d+(t)C ′σ(t).
Now, integrating with respect to t,∫
(b,c,d,t)
Vσ(b, c, d, t)1b>0dG(b, c, d, t) =
∫
t
(c+(t)Cσ(t)− d+(t)C ′σ(t))gt(t)dt
=
∫
t
(c+(t)gt(t) +
d
dt
[d+(t)gt(t)])Cσ(t)dt.
14 KOLOTILIN, MYLOVANOV, ZAPECHELNYUK, LI
Similarly, for b < 0,∫
(b,c,d)
Vσ(b, c, d, t)1b<0g(b, c, d|t)d(b, c, d) = −c−(t)Cσ(t)+d−(t)C ′σ(t)+d−(t)+c−(t)(E[ω]−t).
Now, integrating with respect to t,∫
(b,c,d,t)
Vσ(b, c, d, t)1b<0dG(b, c, d, t) = −
∫
t
(c−(t)Cσ(t)− d−(t)C ′σ(t))gt(t)dt+K
= −
∫
t
(c−(t)gt(t) + ddt [d−(t)gt(t)])Cσ(t)dt+K,
where
K =
∫
t
(
d−(t) + c−(t)(E[ω]− t)
)
gt(t)1b<0dt
is a constant independent of Cσ.
Since the measure of types with b = 0 is zero, we obtain∫
r
Vσ(r)dG(r) =
∫
r
Vσ(r)(1b>0 + 1b<0)dG(r) =
∫
t
I(t)Cσ(t)dt+K,
where
I(t) = (c+(t)− c−(t))gt(t) + ddt [(d+(t)− d−(t))gt(t)].

